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Empirically, social dilemma under information asymmetry are often much
less pronounced than theory predicts. Traders experience a winner's curse
and maintain eciency enhancing exchange of commodities when theory
predicts none. Especially under competition, cursed parties undergo se-
vere losses and thereby fund social welfare. Hence, if one cures the win-
ner's curse, one often decreases social welfare. Here, I test how market
eciency can be maintained without individual losses. In a competitive
common value auction, parties sidestep both market ineciency and a
winner's curse by judging quality-by-price, and setting price-by-quality.
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I study two behavioral institutions to cure the so-called winner's curse in a com-
petitive common value auction where the phenomenon tends to be particularly
strong (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983), (Giliberto and Varaiya 1989), (Hong
and Shum 2002). Thereby, a winner's curse describes how parties disadvantaged
by information fail to identify their expected break-even and incur losses. Two
prominent potential causes have been put forth. First, it is argued that play-
ers somewhat ignore the information hidden in others' actions1 (Bazerman and
Samuelson 1983), (Eyster and Rabin 2005). Second, it is argued that players do
not think suciently many steps about the other player such as to avoid losses
(Crawford and Iriberri 2007).
A number of mechanisms have been tried to cure the winner's curse, such
as experience, learning (Grosskopf et al. 2007), or task simplication (Charness
and Levin 2009) without denite success. While the curse is clearly undesirable
from the individual's point of view, this is not so from a social point of view.
The curse typically increases market eciency, and hence, social welfare under
information asymmetry. Rational parties would anticipate a selection eect of
low qualities into trade (Akerlof 1970), and would sometimes bid such as to
avoid any trade. Hence, there is no surplus, and no social welfare generated2.
Contrary to rational parties, cursed parties do not account for the selection ef-
fect and bid such as to maintain trade. Consequently, market eciency does
not decline, since the cursed party bears the expense to fund social interest. If
one cures her curse, one also decreases social welfare.
Here, I study the performance of two behavioral institutions in curing the
winner's curse without loss in social welfare: judgment-of-quality-by-price, and
setting-price-by-quality3. The social dilemma I choose is the acquiring-a-company-
game (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983), a bilateral trade situation where the
1A rational player will act such that, given her private information, she does not incur a
loss. Hence, from each of her actions, another play can typically infer some bound of the other
player's private information.
2Since by construction of these common value models, buyers value, say a car, more than
sellers do, trade enhances market eciency since the commodity devolves into those hands
which value it most.
3This implies that a seller prices a commodity by taking her valuation of that commodity
(where she breaks even) and adding either a xed absolute prot margin, or a prot margin
proportional to that value.
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uations of the target diers by less than 50%, the selection eect is so strong,
that a rational acquirer will not want to trade.
While the decision whether or not to nally agree on an acquisition may be
bilateral only, the nal pair is likely to result from an interaction of several par-
ties. Typically, an acquirer has identied several acquisition candidates/targets
and will also compete against other acquirers for acquiring the most attractive
target. I show that, if targets derive their reservation prices from their quality,
a price-quality link emerges, and the dilemma under information asymmetry
shrinks. It shrinks in direct proportion to an increased number of targets while
the degree to which it shrinks, depends on the actual association between target
price and target quality. No social dilemma need arise from asymmetric infor-
mation, and hence, no winner's curse.
Subsequently, I test the multilateral model in an experiment. Therein, tar-
gets associate price and quality, and a price-quality link emerges endogenously.
It emerges in an environment where targets are given a strong incentive to ex-
ploit acquirers who judge quality by price, rather than an incentive to create a
price-quality link. The residual experimental winner's curse, and the underlying
experimental social dilemma, are small.
My results add to the discussion whether or not the winner's curse may be
seen as a pure laboratory phenomenon. It is argued that in the eld, certain
institutional features which the lab fails to provide, will mitigate the winner's
curse (Dyer and Kagel 1996)4. Institutional arrangements such as accounting
standards, clauses on unfair competition, may in particular cause price-quality
links in eld. Indeed, there is evidence that companies' market prices relate to
quality related variables such as book value and earnings (Collins et al. 1997),
rm size, security returns (Barber and Lyon 1997), or R&D activities (Blundell
et al. 1999). If acquirers in the eld exploit that information, the logic of my
model implies there to be no winner's curse which is also claimed by a recent
study of take-overs in the eld (Boone and Mulherin 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the social dilemma in the
4So far, there is both eld evidence against (Boone and Mulherin 2008), and eld evidence
for winner's curse phenomena (Morck et al. 1990), (Schwert 2000)
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company game assuming judgment of quality by price in presence of a price
quality link. It also provides some arguments from the literature why these
assumptions might hold. Section 3 describes the experiment by which I test my
model. Section 4 reviews my results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 The bilateral acquiring-a-company game
An acquirer a and a target company t negotiate target rm ownership. The
target rm has quality  v which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the in-
terval [0,1]. A target rm knows her own quality v while an acquirer only knows
the overall distribution of target qualities in the market. Acquirer a moves rst
and makes an acquisition oer p 2 [0;1]. Target t moves second, and decides
whether to accept or to reject the oer, i.e. t 2 f0;1g based on her private
information v. If target t accepts an oer p, she gets p and gives up ownership.
In this case, the acquirer obtains target ownership and pays oer p. If a target
vetoes an oer, neither party earns anything.
Thereby, parties dier in their valuation of the target. Acquirers valuate tar-
get ownership at the actual target quality v, while targets valuate ownership only
by fraction q;q 2 [0;1] of this quality. Hence, one has payos: a = (v  p)t,
and t = (p qv)t. Thereby, q interlinks parties' valuation of target owner-
ship and denotes a common-value parameter. Since acquirers value ownership
more than targets, acquisitions promote market eciency/social welfare by de-
volving ownership to the party who values it most. An acquisition increases
market eciency/social welfare the more, the smaller q.
If one backwardly inducts, target t in round two accepts any oer which
yields her a nonnegative prot, i.e.  = 1 $ p  q v. Hence, every acceptance
t = 1 reveals some of a target's private information, i.e. p > q v. In round one,
an acquirer rules out dominated strategies by making the minimal oer every
target will accept, i.e. p = q vmax = q 1. An acquirer's expected payo condi-
tional on p = q is: E(a) = E(vjp  qv)   p = E(
p
2q)   p5. This expectation is
5E(vjqv  p)   p = E(vjv 
p
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er a price of zero
to circumvent losses, and we observe no acquisitions. Hence, in Bayesian Nash




1 : p  q   v
0 : else: (1) pBNE
a =

q : q  1
2
0 : else: (2)
For q > 1=2, theory predicts a social dilemma since acquisitions which increase
market eciency, do not occur. Experimentally, the dilemma is smaller since
often, acquirers experience a winner's curse. If we explicitly allowed for the
winner's curse in a so-called  - Cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005),
acquirers would oer q for q 
1+ 
2 where  measures an acquirer's degree of
cursedness, i.e. the probability which she assigns to the event that a target does
not condition her acceptance on p  q v.
Note that at oer q, the acquirer can aord even the highest priced target,
and that a target has a reservation price at her true break even point, i.e. q v.
Hence, if one assumes acquirer a to judge quality by price6, and target t to
set her reservation price by quality, the solution of the game does not change.
Similarly, the solution is not aected if, instead of moving sequentially, parties
moved simultaneously, and the acquisition was agreed upon whenever the oer
exceeded a target's reservation price.
2.2 m Na ve Acquirers, n Na ve Targets
Now, assume that there still is only one acquirer a, but that there are multiple
targets, or multiple acquisition candidates, tj=1;:::;n(2). Each target has quality
vtj which is i.i.d. randomly drawn from a uniform distribution U(0,1). Since
there are n targets, qualities follow a multivariate uniform density nvn 1
 with
multivariate uniform cumulative probability density function vn
. Individual
payos are the same as in 2.1.
Assume that the only acquirer a wants to acquire at most one7 target, and
that in general, she judges quality by price, a characteristic I denote by . She
6As long as she does not incur losses.
7For simplicity, I assume here that the acquirer does not want to acquire more than one
rm at once. In practice, the number of acquisitions might be restrained to one at a time by
integration costs.
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acquire the highest priced target she can aord at a given oer p
a. If parallely,





a price-quality link emerges. I denote this second behavioral rule by . If the
price-quality link is perfect, reservation prices truly re
ect targets' break-even
points and reservation prices fully reveal quality, i.e.
p

tj( vtj) = q vtj for all  vtj 2 [0;1] and j = 1;:::;n. (3)
What are parties' mutual responses constraint to rules  and ? In round
T=28, targets set reservation prices p

tj(vtj) = qvtj. In round T=1, acquirer
a

i who judges quality by price, wants to acquire the highest priced target at
minimal cost. The minimal oer which even the target with the highest reser-
vation price accepts, is q. An acquirer's expected payo from an acquisition
conditional on oer q, writes:
E(ajp

tj=1;:::;n(vtj=1;:::;n) = q vtj=1;:::;n)
= n
R pa=q














Since acquirer a acquires the highest priced target and targets set their reserva-
tion prices at q vtj, acquirer a's payo depends now on how the maximal value,
i.e.  vmax, of n draws from a uniform distribution increases with the number of
draws n. The rst factor within the integral is the acquirer's payo function
from the acquisition of the highest priced target, and the second factor is sim-
ply the density, or probability mass distributed over the interval of qualities. In
particular, acquirer a's break-even point shifts from q = 1=2 up to q = n
n+1.
PROPOSITION 1. If targets set p

j(vtj) = qvtj and the only acquirer
m = 1 judges quality by price, acquisitions result within range q = [0; n
n+1] at
oer p
a = q. For q > n
n+1, acquirer a precludes acquisitions by oering p
a = 0.
Hence, an increase in the number of targets n makes mutually benecial and
ecient acquisitions more likely and certain for n ! 1. Now, let me also
8For the sake of a structured presentation, I keep the sequential notion for the solution of
the simultaneous game.
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
i=1;:::;m(2) who
judge quality by price. Assume that there can be only one nal acquisition9,
the case where, for n = 1, and/or in absence of a price-quality link, the social
dilemma/the winner's curse turns maximal (see appendices 2 and 3).
In T=2, targets set p

tj(vtj) = qvtj, and want to be acquired by the acquirer
who has stated the highest oer above that reservation price. In T=1, all m




Thereby, oers will increase until all acquirer prots are exhausted. The minimal
oer which exceeds even the highest reservation price stated by a target, was
q10. Acquirers break even at n
(n+1). Acquirer competition will now increase
price oers up to p
ai = n
n+1 for m 2, where all acquirers expect zero payos.
Altogether, one has responses (5), and (6):
p





n+1 : q  n
n+1;m  2;n  2
0 : q > n
n+1;m  2;n  2:
(6)
PROPOSITION 2. If n targets who set p

tj(vtj) = qvtj, and m acquirers





for i = 1;:::;m( 2):
For the bilateral case we had theory predict a social dilemma (or a winner's
curse) for q > 1=2. If one assumes judgment of quality by price, and setting
price-by quality for a number of competing acquirers on the one hand, and for a
number of acquisition candidates on the other hand, a social dilemma arises only
within q 2 [ n
n+1;1]. Hence, the social dilemma under information asymmetry
shrinks in relation to the number of acquisition candidates n. Thereby, acquirer
competition merely increases acquisition oers, while a multiplicity of targets
extends the interval for which mutually benecial acquisitions increase social
welfare. Next, I provide some arguments for why and under which conditions,
the assumptions which drive this eect, might be realistic.
9This is done for three reasons: with only one acquisition, competition selects the acquirer
with the heaviest curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983), (Giliberto and Varaiya 1989), (Hong
and Shum 2002), and induces the phenomenon to be circumvented by the two behavioral rules.
Second, it is the case where targets have the maximal incentive n
n+1 not to establish a price-
quality link, if acquirers judge quality by price.
10If an acquisition could be achieved at oer q, an acquirer would earn n
n+1   q.
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Theory and Evidence
The literature provides a number of theoretical arguments and empirical nd-
ings which support the assumptions of my model that acquirers might judge
quality-by-price, and that targets might link their reservation prices to their
quality. Some of these apply only in the eld, and some also in the laboratory.
Judgment of quality by price. A number of studies have found acquirers
to judge quality-by-price on eld, and on experimental data, such as (Leavitt
1954), (Gabor and Granger 1966), (Rao and Monroe 1989), (Lichtenstein et al.
1993). An early argument points out that such a decision rule could arise from a
potentially deceptive belief that price would result from a competitive interplay
of rational supply and demand (Scitovszky 1944/45). More applicable to a lab-
oratory setting is the observation that individuals judge quality by price, if price
is the only available cue on quality (Tull et al. 1964), (Zeithaml 1988). Intrigu-
ingly, (Shiv et al. 2005) nd in recent experiments that price exerts a so-called
placebo-eect and that judgment of quality by price is partly unconscious. Some
studies report that judgment of quality by price is often used for high-priced
commodities and re
ects a snob eect (Alcaly and Klevorick 1970), (Brucks et
al. 2000). Take-overs, one area of application of the acquiring-a-company game
are usually prestigious projects, and a snob eect can apply there (Morck et al.
1990), (D'Aveni and Kesner 1993).
Setting price-by-quality. In my model, a target has an incentive to deviate
from setting p

tj = q vj, since by doing so, she decreases her chances to be ac-
quired. Outside the laboratory, such a rule might be enforced institutionally.
Market and takeover prices may institutionally be bound to somewhat re
ect
quality, for instance by a country's generally accepted accounting principles11,
or a country's clauses on unfair competition and consumer protection12. These
11In U.S. GAAP SFAS 141, SFAS 142, FAS 157, any goodwill or dierence between a fair
market value and a purchase price would underly certain restrictions, i.e. an impairment
test, or certain depreciation rules. In particular, US GAAP recently requires intangible assets
be evaluated and separated from any goodwill if possible at all. Since a target quality is
somewhat traceable for an acquirer, a target in pursuit of an acquisition has less margin to
overstate her price.
12For Germany, see Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG, Bundesgesetzblatt BGBl
I 2004, pp. 1414.
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enforce  such that given a sucient number of targets n, no winner's curse re-
sults. Similarly, multiple cues on quality may provide a potential control for the
price cue and countervail a target's incentive to misstate her actual reservation
price in the eld (Wolinsky 1983).
But why should  apply if it is not enforced institutionally? For one, targets
might apply a simple pricing rule and state a price which is their own valuation
q vtj plus a prot margin which is proportional to that valuation (20%, for in-
stance). Such a pricing behavior would unintentionally result in a price-quality
link. Similarly, targets might hold a preference for honesty (Evans III et al.
2001), (Gneezy 2005), (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). A target who would
accept every oer as long as she does not incur a loss might consider it dishon-
est to state a reservation price that grossly diers from her actual break even
point. These could be reasons for why one might observe a price-quality link in
the laboratory. Next, I describe the experimental test of the model derived in
sections 2.1 and 2.2.
2.4 Experimental Protocol
I conducted a computerized experiment with 256 (138 female and 118 male) un-
dergraduate students at the University of Jena, randomly drawn from various
elds of study. Participants were recruited using Orsee (Greiner 2004). The
software was developed with the help of z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). At the be-
ginning of each session, participants were randomly seated at visually isolated
computer terminals where they received a hardcopy of the German instruc-
tions13. Subsequently, participants answered a control questionnaire to ensure
their understanding. The experiment started after all participants had success-
fully completed the questionnaire.
I ran eight sessions with 32 participants each. The experiment had a 2x2x3
within-subjects-factorial design. I varied the number of acquirers m, the number
of targets n, and the common value parameter q as follows:
n;m 2 f1;3g and q 2 f:3;:6;:8g:
13See Appendix B for a translation into English.
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that, for a rst cycle of ten rounds, subjects encountered one of two asymmetric
markets with either:
(1) one target fn = 1g and three acquirers fm = 3g, or
(2) three targets fn = 3g and one acquirer fm = 1g.
In each round, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in
their type of market. For a second cycle of ten rounds, subjects encountered
one of the following two symmetric markets with either:
(3) three targets and three acquirers, i.e. fm = 3 = ng, or
(4) one acquirer and one target, i.e. fm = 1 = ng.
Then, each subject repeated the rst cycle, and afterwards, repeated the second
cycle. To check for ordering eects, four out of eight sessions were run in an
alternative sequence of cycles.
Within one cycle of ten rounds, the common value parameter q varied such
that q was set to q = 0:3 for four rounds, then to q = 0:6 for four rounds,
and nally, to q = 0:8 for two rounds14. Hence, after 10 rounds, a subject
had experienced all experimental constellations of the common value parameter
q 2 f:3;:6;:8g. For the range of qualities v, I chose an intuitive interval of
[0,10]. Throughout the experiment, it was common knowledge that the acquirer
with the highest oer would be selected to acquire the target who had indicated
the highest reservation price below that oer. Thereby, I tried to trigger a
strong winner's curse on the acquirer side, and gave targets a strategic incentive
to overstate ptj such that any potential price-quality link would be put to a
stress test. Let me review the predictions of my model for the experimental
constellations above:
PREDICTION 1. For fn = 1;mg and q 2 f0:6;0:8g, acquisitions imply
a winner's curse. Judging quality by price, and setting price by quality has no
eect. The winner's curse will increase if acquirers compete, i.e. m = 3.
PREDICTION 2. For fn = 3;mg and q 2 f0:6g, acquisitions imply no
14Since for q = :8, no acquisition is predicted for any n;m constellation, I wanted to avoid
frustrating participants.
9
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 011winner's curse if acquirers judge quality by price and sellers set prices by quality.
PREDICTION 3. For 8fn;mg and q 2 f0:8g, acquisitions imply a win-
ner's curse. Increasing the number of targets to n = 3 is insucient to make
acquisitions mutually benecial, even if quality is judged by price, and prices
are set by quality.
A session lasted, on average, 108 minutes (minimum: 90, maximum: 120),
and average earnings were €4.50 for acquirers (€19.10 for targets). Minimal
payos were €-18.50 for acquirers, and €8.50 for targets. Maximal payos were
€22.70 for acquirers, and €47.50 for targets. At the outset, participants agreed
to rules regarding overall losses (see the instructions in Appendix C) and were
randomly assigned both roles and cycles.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Data Analysis
Do parties manage to forego a social dilemma without a winner's curse for mul-
tiple n? To see this, table 1 displays parties' average earnings per round for all
experimental parameters fn;m;qg.
role fn;mg q = 0:3 q = 0:6 q = 0:8
;2()
ai
fm = 1;n = 1g 0.40 (2.85) -0.64 (2.75) -1.06 (2.27)
fm = 3;n = 1g -0.01 (2.95) -1.07 (2.54) -1.73 (2.33)
fm = 1;n = 3g 1.30 (2.47) -0.29 (2.28) -1.08 (1.96)
fm = 3;n = 3g 0.75 (2.88) -0.56 (2.31) -1.19 (2.10)
tj
fm = 1;n = 1g 2.27 (0.85) 1.91 (1.65) 1.59 (1.82)
fm = 3;n = 1g 3.27 (0.89) 2.67 (1.53) 2.40 (1.87)
fm = 1;n = 3g 1.78 (0.74) 1.58 (1.37) 1.61 (1.57)
fm = 3;n = 3g 3.06 (0.86) 2.32 (1.39) 1.98 (1.68)
Table 1: Average and variance of parties' earnings for fn;m;qg.
For all q > 0:5, acquirers incur losses, i.e., a winner's curse. A pure increase in
acquirer comptition, i.e. m, increases that winner's curse substantially for all
fn;mg constellations (prediction 1). However, a pure increase in the number
of targets n within n=(n+1), reduces that winners curse substantially by some
50% (prediction 2). Varying fm = 1;n = 1g into fm = 1;n = 3g for q = 0:6
10
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fm = 3;n = 1g into fm = 3;n = 3g for q = 0:6, losses drop from -1.07 to
-0.56. At the same time, variance in losses shrinks notably. For q = 0:8 where
q 6 n=(n + 1), a potential price-quality link was predicted to turn ineective
(prediction 3). Indeed, an increase in n for q = 0:8 does not reduce acquirer
losses compared to fn = 1;m = 1g. Yet, acquirer losses for fm = 3;n = 1g are
much more severe (-1.73) than acquirer losses for fm = 3;n = 3g (-1.19). Hence,
an increase in n for q = 0:8 still seems to take an eect by softening the excess
winner's curse from acquirer competition. Target earnings re
ect the eect of
the price-quality link15: A pure increase in targets n invariably decreases target
earnings as long as q 6 n=(n +1). However, that price-quality link seems to be
imperfect, since acquirers still incur a residual winner's curse.
RESULT 1. Acquirer competition triggers a strong winner's curse. If we
multiply the number of targets, the curse decreases substantially.
Overall, my model seems to capture the logic behind parties' experimental pay-
os. It remains to be seen whether the same holds for parties' decision variables.
Figs. 1 and 2 depict densities16 of acquirer oers and target reservation prices
for all fm;ng. I start with acquirers' response to competition and compare oer
densities fm = 1;n = 1g and fm = 3;n = 1g, i.e. the thinnest, and the thickest
line in Fig. 1. In line with the predictions of the model, oer densities shift
rightward (i.e. oers increase), if more acquirers compete. Hence, acquirers
make higher oers under acquirer competition and compete against each other
for the acquisition of the highest priced target.
price oers pi

















Fig. 1: Oer densities.
reservation prices pj














Fig. 2: Reservation price densities.
15Since acquirers' and targets' earnings are linked by the common value parameter q.
16Bandwidth is obtained using Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman 1986, p.48). Patterns
remain invariant under other choices, i.e. via cross validation (Scott and Terrell 1987).
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densities with the same m, but dierent n. The oer density for fm = 1;n = 1g,
i.e. the thinnest line in Fig. 1, peaks earlier, and less pronouncedly than the
one for fm = 1;n = 3g which is marked second-thinnest. Hence, oers seem to
increase a little in n, which is a sign for judgment of quality-by-price.
Target reservation prices show very large variance. They might indeed de-
pend upon i.i.d. uniform random draws of the actual target quality vtj which
would re
ect a price-quality-link. Multiplying the number of targets n drives
reservation prices upward, i.e. density fm = 1;n = 3g peaks later, and more
pronouncely than the respective density for fm = 1;n = 1g. Moreover, acquirer
competition seems to drive reservation prices a little upward since the density
for fm = 1;n = 3g peaks slightly earlier than density fm = 3;n = 3g. Such
target competition will weaken a potential price-quality link, and may be re-
sponsible for the residual winner's curse in table 1.
Figs. 3-5 focus on the essential ingredient of the model, which is the overall
strength of the price-quality link. They depict to what extent targets' reserva-
tion prices ptj correlate with targets' actual break-even points qvtj
17. For all
fn;m;qg, one clearly sees a relationship between ptj and qvtj.
Figs. 3-5: Is there an overall price-quality relationship?












Fig. 3: pj(qvtj), q=0.3














Fig. 4: pj(qvtj), q=0.6.











Fig. 5: pj(qvtj), q=0.8.
Visually, the assumption given which a multiplicity of targets reduces and the
social dilemma, and the winner's curse, holds.
17All lines are regression lines estimated by a locally linear kernel regression, a robust local
smoothing technique. Characteristics of all lines have been reconrmed by other, more global
regression techniques. Price quality links of mean and median show the same properties.
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a strong incentive to deviate from any price quality relationship since only the
highest priced target will qualify for an acquisition. Three aspects of the overall
price-quality link stand out: First, with increasing q, price quality links run
closer to the 45 line where on has a perfect price-quality link, i.e. ptj = qvtj.
Second, an increase in qvtj by One typically increases ptj by less than One. This
could result if targets added a xed amount to q vtj, or simply re
ect that for a
higher q vtj, there is a smaller strategic margin to overstate it. Third, the slopes
of the price-quality link vary with q. For q = 0:6 as compared to q = 0:3, the
price-quality relation for small qualities is a little weaker than for high qualities.
For q = 0:8, the price quality relation for small qualities nearly vanishes when
there are several targets, i.e. fm;n 6= 1g.
Are acquirers indeed able to exploit this overall price-quality link such as to
circumvent a winner's curse? If so, the price quality link must also exist for the
subset of actually acquired targets. In particular, there must not be any selec-
tion of targets into acquisitions whose reservation prices are not linked to their
break-even. Figures 6-8 depict the price-quality link for the subset of actually
acquired targets tj only.
Figs. 6-8: Is there a price-quality link for acquired targets?












Fig. 6: pj(qvtj), q=0.3.














Fig. 7: pj(qvtj), q=0.6











Fig. 8: pj(qvtj), q=0.8.
The price quality link for the subset of acquired targets matches the overall link
in a number of properties. Most importantly, a price-quality link exists also for
the set of acquired targets. As before, price-quality links for most fn;m;qg run
closer to the 45 line, the higher qvtj. Again, the slopes of those price-quality
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ever, two aspects stand out. First, on markets where acquirers get a larger part
of the surplus, i.e. q = 0:3, targets with qvtj in [0;1] overstate their break-even
more pronouncedly than other targets do. Acquirers select these targets for an
acquisition. A positive price-quality link reemerges for qvtj > 1. Second, when
break evens are very high for q 2 f0:6;0:8g, some lines fall bellow the 45degree
line. Here, potentially eciency-loving targets start to set reservation prices
below their break even18.
3.2 Treatment Eects
Here, I quantify to what extent the assumptions and predictions of the model
derived in sections 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Throughout, I rely on linear xed-eects
models19. Table 2 details my results on acquirers' oers.
variable coef. Std. Error t-Value p-Value
Intercept 2.97 0.15 19.63 0.00
q08 0.07 0.05 1.33 0.18
nq0306 0.10 0.03 3.05 0.01
nq08 0.15 0.07 2.22 0.03
m 0.68 0.04 18.12 0.00
Period -0.02 0.00 -14.65 0.00
Table 2: Acquirer oers, R
2
adj = 0:45.
Acquirers who judge quality by price were predicted to increase their oers
if q = 0:3 rises to q = 0:6, but not if it rises to q = 0:8. Indeed, acquirers
increase their oers in nq0306, but do not increase their oers in q08 anymore.
Moreover, acquirers who judged quality by price were predicted to increase their
oers with the number of sellers n as long as q 2 f0:3;0:6g. Indeed, oers sig-
nicantly depend on the respective Dummy nq0306. Contrary to the model,
18These kinks are not due to kernel boundary bias. Kinks still stand out in the median,
and also more global (robust) smoothing techniques, i.e. quantile splines.
19All xed eects models are estimated implementing a dummy on the individual level.
Residuals do not correlate with tted values/regressors. I controlled for these assumption
violations to make sure that there is no misspecication of the functional form, or omission
of a relevant variable. Throughout, I use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
14
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 011acquirers seem to increase their oers in n even for q = 0:8. The respective
Dummy nq08 has an even larger impact than nq0306, but is only weakly signi-
cant. Oers strongly increase in the number of acquirers m and hence, acquirers
seem to strongly compete for the highest priced target. In summary, acquirer of-
fers depend on the essential ingredients of the model, i.e. the number of targets
n, and the number of acquirers m20. Hence, if there was a price quality link,
n would extend the range of q for which acquisitions are mutually benecial.
However, acquirers seem to rely on n beyond q = 0:6. This implies losses, and
it also raises the question whether acquirers consciously decide whether or not
to rely on a judgment of quality by price.
RESULT 2. Acquirers increase their oers in response to target number
n. This is in line with a judgment of quality by price.
The model in section 2.2 predicted mutually benecial acquisitions beyond
q = 0:5 only, if targets linked their reservation prices to their quality. Table 3
details my results on overall targets' reservation prices.
variable coef. Std.Error t-value p-value
Intercept 3.24 0.27 11.97 0.00
qvtj 0.68 0.01 79.86 0.00
n 0.61 0.05 13.44 0.00
m 0.15 0.03 4.56 0.01
Table 3: Overall targets' reservation prices, R
2
adj = 0:63.
Overall targets' reservation prices are strongly linked to targets' break-even
point q vtj. While targets also comply somewhat with their incentive to overstate
their actual break even in response to n, the price-quality link is even larger than
the corresponding overstatement. Targets seem to expect acquirers to compete,
since reservation prices also increase in the number of acquirers m.
However, it is yet to be seen by how far this price-quality link carries over
to the set of acquired targets tj. Since targets respond to n, it might be that
acquirers' judgment of quality by price selects those targets for an acquisition
whose prices are not linked to their quality. Mutually benecial acquisitions
require yet that a price-quality link also exists on the subset of acquired targets.
Table 4 presents the results for this subset only.
20The impact of n, and m has been veried for a large variety of alternative specications.
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Intercept 2.18 0.44 4.92 0.00
qvtj 0.50 0.02 25.72 0.00
n 0.72 0.06 12.70 0.00
m 0.61 0.05 13.07 0.00
Table 4: Acquired targets' reservation prices, R
2
adj = 0:61.
The price-quality link also exists for the set of acquired targets, but it is some-
what weaker than on the set of overall targets. Acquired targets respond more
strongly to target competition than overall targets do. They also react more
strongly to acquirer competition m than overall targets do.
RESULT 3. There is a link between reservation prices and target qualities
in general, and in particular, for the subset of acquired targets.
Altogether, I nd empirical support for the essential ingredients of my model.
First, acquirers comply with the market mechanism that only the highest oer
qualies for an acquisition. They strongly react to m. Second, acquirers respond
to n, but do so even when this is not predicted. Third, targets voluntarily es-
tablish a price-quality link. Hence, it is not by coincidence that we observe a
substantially smaller winner's curse (see section 3.2) as n increases. Residual
losses show that the price quality link is not perfect, that is, reservation prices
do not fully reveal quality.
4 Conclusion
This paper tests to what extent parties who judge quality by price, and set prices
by quality, can forego both a winner's curse, and inecient market outcomes
under information asymmetry. Thereby, the party who has private information
would systematically link her actions to her private information, and thereby,
reveal that information partly. The degree to which the social dilemma under
information asymmetry dissolves, depends on the strength of the link between
an individuals' actions and her private information.
The acquiring-a-company game (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983) illustrates
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an individual's self interest, despite the fact that they would enhance social wel-
fare by improving market eciency. In particular, rational self interest diverges
from social interest (Akerlof 1970), if parties value the object to negotiation sim-
ilarly. Experimentally, market ineciency is often less pronounced than theory
predicts because one party suers a winner's curse. Thereby, the information-
ally disadvantaged party involuntarily funds the socially ecient outcome by an
individual loss.
I formulate a multilateral acquiring-a-company game assuming targets who
set reservation prices by quality, and acquirers who assume such a price-quality
link. If the price-quality link is perfect, the social dilemma fully dissolves if the
number of targets is high enough. In an experimental test, I conrm a stong,
but imperfect price-quality link, and I nd that acquirers increase their oers in
competition for the highest priced target. As a consequence, the social dilemma
is less pronounced, and acquirer losses shrink by one half as compared to the
reference case 21. Since the price-quality link is imperfect, the number of targets
would need to be a little higher than required by my model to fully circumvent
a winner's curse. These results are of particular interest given the reported fail-
ures to cure the curse by learning, experience (Grosskopf et al. 2007), or task
simplication (Charness and Levin 2009).
Judgment of quality by price and a price-quality link can emerge from var-
ious sources. Judgment of quality-by-price is an empirical phenomenon when
price is the only available cue on quality (Zeithaml 1988). Similarly, judgment of
quality-by-price may succeed in the eld where a positive price-quality link may
be legally enforced, for instance, by laws of consumer protection. Subjects may
then carry such decision rules over to the lab (Homan et al. 1994), (Homan
et al. 1996), since judgment of quality-by price is found to be partly uncon-
scious (Shiv et al. 2005). Setting a reservation price which is unrelated to one's
quality might be considered to be unethical, or violate a preference for honesty
(Gneezy 2005) that may even be revealed in professional/strategic situations
21The bilateral situation under both behavioral institutions coincides with acquiring-a-
company (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983) where, if parties dier by less than 50 % in their
valuation of the target, a winner's curse (or a market ineciency) occurs.
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those institutions in the eld where they may similarly cure the consequences
of imperfect information. In particular, we would not always predict a social
dilemma under asymmetric information, and consequently, no winner's curse.
Hence, the existence of such decision rules may also be a reason why sometimes,
a winner's curse is observed in the eld (Schwert 2000), (Morck et al. 1990),
and sometimes, it is not (Boone and Mulherin 2008).
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A. Bayesian Nash equilibrium bilateral trade model.
If one backwardly inducts, target t in round T=2 accepts any oer which yields













In T=1, an acquirer rules out dominated strategies by making the minimal
oer every target will accept, i.e. p = q  vmax = q  1. A buyer's expected
payo conditional on p = q is: E(a) = E(vjp  qv)   p = E(
p
2q)   p22. This
expectation is only nonnegative for q  1=2. For q > 1=2, an acquirer oers
zero to circumvent losses, and one observes no acquisitions. Hence, one has (8).
B: One Na ve Acquirer, n Rational Targets
If an only acquirer a judges quality by price, and multiple acquisition candi-
dates tj=1;:::;n(2) of i.i.d. uniformly distributed qualities vj do not set prices by
quality (do not link their reservation prices to their quality), individual payos
are the same as in 2.1. In T=2, targets who know that only the highest priced
target will be acquired, all state a reservation price equal to the maximal oer
an acquirer wants to make. In T=1, the only acquirer a wants to acquire the
highest priced target at minimal cost. The minimal oer even the target with
the highest quality  vtj = vmax would accept, is p
a = q. Acquirer a's expected
payo conditional on oer p






































The product is simply acquirer a0
s payo from an acquisition23 times the like-
lihood that there by any acquisition at all (the likelihood that oer p
a exceeds
22E(vjqv  p)   p = E(vjv 
p





2q. Hence: E(a) = (
p
2q   p)
23The same as in the bilateral model, see App. A p. 21.
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s payo is nonnegative i










q : p  q   v
q vtj else
(11)
Acquirer a acquires one of the equally priced targets; acquirer a earns
vtj  p
a , the acquired target tj earns p
a  qvtj, and all other targets tj 6= tj
earn zero.
C. m Na ve Acquirers, n Rational Targets
If one has several a

i=1;:::;m(2) acquirers who judge quality by price, all m ac-
quirers will compete against each other to acquire target24 tj with the highest
reservation price.
In T=2, targets know that only the highest priced target will be acquired.
Hence, all targets set their reservation price equal to the very oer which will
result from acquirers' competition in T=1., just as long as that oer allows tar-
gets to break even. In T=1, an only acquirer had expected payo (9) from an
acquisition, and acquisitions were mutually benecial i q  1
2. The minimal
oer even the highest priced target accepts, is q. The oer an acquirer can make
without incurring a loss, is p
ai = 1
2
25. Acquirer competition will now drive up
prices within range q  p
ai  1
2 up to p
ai = 1
2 where all acquirers earn zero.
I q > 1
2 in (3), every acquirer expects a loss from an acquisition. Hence, for
q > 1
2, every acquirer precludes an acquisition by oering p
ai = 0. Altogether,
we have mutual responses:
24One could loosen this assumption by allowing for several acquisition pairs. Yet, exper-
imentally, allowing for only one trading pair will induce strong acquirer competition which
should bring about a very strong winner's curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983), (Giliberto
and Varaiya 1989), (Hong and Shum 2002). Since it is the aim of the paper to see whether
individuals can sidestep the curse if quality is judged by price and price is set by quality, I
allow for only one trading pair.
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1
2 : q  1
2






2 : q  1
2
0 : q > 1
2
(13)
PROPOSITION A1. : If m acquirers who judge quality by price and n ra-
tional targets compete for the only acquisition, price oers increase to p
ai = 1
2
as long as q  1
2. For q > 1
2, acquirers continue to preclude acquisitions by
setting p
ai = 0. In particular, the acquirer with the highest oer p
ai  p
ai
amongst all acquirers i = 1;:::;m;i 6= i acquires target tj who, amongst all
targets available at p
ai, has ptj  ptj for all tj=1;:::;n, j 6= j.
B. Instructions11;12
Instructions
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in this experiment. For
showing up, you receive €2. Please read the following instructions carefully.
Instructions are identical for all participants. Please do not communicate with
other participants, and switch o your mobile phones. If you have any questions,
raise your hand - we are going to answer them individually at your place.
During the experiment all amounts of money will be indicated in ECU (Ex-
perimental Currency Units) where 1 ECU=0.4 €. The sum of your payos from
all rounds will be disbursed to you in cash at the end of the experiment. Your
initial endowment is 4 ECU. Payos achieved during the experiment will be
added to this amount. Negative payos are possible, and an eventually negative
overall payo has to be compensated by working at the institute. The hourly
wage in this case is set to 10 €.
11Instructions were written in German. The following chapter reproduces a translation into
English. Emphases like, e.g., bold font, are taken from the original text.
12Notations of variables do not always coincide with the paper - I chose the rst letter of
the German word (e.g. "oer" is named "g" like 'gebot') to facilitate the experimental task.
Especially q, targets' valuation in the model, is called "a", letter "q" being already used for
"quality".
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The experiment consists of several rounds. Participants take on dierent roles.
Your role is randomly determined at the beginning of the experiment and re-
mains the same throughout all rounds of the experiment. Your role will be
communicated at the beginning of the rst round. In each round, you are ran-
domly matched to groups of other participants. In each round, participants
make decisions. Via their decisions, participants aect their own, and the other
participants' payos.
On a market, groups of potential sellers and potential buyers of a
commodity meet. Each seller is endowed with a unit of the same commodity,
but each unit has a dierent quality q. The quality of the commodity is expressed
by a number between 0 and 10, randomly drawn at the beginning of each round.
Thereby, 0 is the lowest, and 10 is the highest quality. Each quality between 0
and 10 occurs with the same probability. Each potential seller knows the quality
of her commodity, while potential buyers do not.
Buyers and sellers valuate the commodity dierently: buyers valuate the
commodity at its actual quality. Each seller valuates the good only at a fraction
of its actual quality, that is, a  q with a < 1. This fraction a is known to both
parties. For four successive rounds, a is xed at 0.3, followed by four rounds
with a = 0:6, and two rounds with a = 0:8. (In the beginning of each round the
actual value of a is indicated.) The monetary value of the commodity is thus
always higher for buyers than it is for sellers.
A round proceeds as follows:
1. Unaware of the actual quality of the commodity, each buyer in a group
of buyers indicates an oer g between 0 and 10.
2. Unaware of buyers' oers, but aware of the actual quality q of her com-
modity, each seller in a group of sellers chooses a minimum price p. Starting
from this price limit, she is willing to sell her commodity.
3. If at most one oer exceeds one of the minimum prices stated, there is
trade. The buyer with the highest oer buys from the seller with the highest
minimum price below that oer. Only one unit of the commodity is traded.
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Buyers and sellers who do not participate in trade receive a payo of 0 ECU.
The buyer who participates in trade receives the dierence between the actual
quality of the acquired commodity and the price paid for its acquisition. She
thus receives: q   g in ECU.
The seller who participates in trade receives oer g and delivers the commodity
to the buyer. Her payo is therefore g   a  q in ECU.
Group sizes of buyers and sellers vary throughout the experiment. The following
situations are possible:
1. Markets with 1 seller and 1 buyer
2. Markets with 3 sellers and 1 buyer
3. Markets with 3 sellers and 3 buyers
4. Markets with 1 seller and 1 buyer
We will inform you at the beginning of each round which situation you are going
to encounter.
Example: The fraction a at which sellers vvaluate the commodity be 0:3.
You encounter a market with two sellers and two buyers. Buyers indicate their
oers g. Unaware of these, sellers determine their individual minimum prices p
as detailed in the following table.
Buyers' bids Sellers' minimum prices Quality of goods
B1: g = 3:0 S1: p = 2:5 S1: q = 5:0
B2: g = 2:8 S2: p = 2:0 S2: q = 4:2
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below that oer comes from seller S1 with p = 2:5. These two participants now
exchange seller S1's commodity with quality q = 5:0. Payos are calculated as
follows: All those participants not having been involved in trade, that is B2 and
S2, receive a payo of 0 ECU.
Participants who have traded, that is, S1 and V1, obtain the following: Buyer
B1 receives the quality minus her oer, q g = 5 3 = 2 in ECU. Seller S1 gets
the oer g = 3, but delivers the commodity she evaluates at aq = 0:35 = 1:5
ECU. Her payo therefore amounts to: g   a  q = 3   1:5 = 1:5 in ECU.
We ask for your patience until the experiment starts. Please stay calm. If you
have any questions, raise your hand. Before the experiment starts, we ask you
to answer a number of control questions.
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